This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable's core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author's own "institutional game. " Finally, we assess Amable's achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable's methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker's horizons and promote consistent solutions.
Introduction
The Diversity of Capitalism (DoC) is a vital modern concept in economics and political science. It refers primarily to comparative studies. Broadly viewed, DoC is a part of New Institutional Economics (NIE) -an increasingly popular heterodox economics school. Institutions, their role in economic development, and the conditions required for institutional change are at the centre of the debate in Europe and United States [Amable, 2003] . The institutional scheme of the economy (including financial system) is now perceived as a source of comparative advantage [Hall, Soskice, 2001; Schneider, Paunescu, 2012; Johnston, Hancké, Pant, 2013] . Comparing the economic performance of different countries from the perspective of NIE therefore seems crucial when designing efficient economic policies.
This article describes and assesses the results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance [Amable, 2003] . After introducing the topic, core definitions are presented. The key concept, institutional complementarity is described in the next section of the paper. We also apply selected game theory concepts to analyse institutional interlinkages in the economy before presenting our conclusions.
Core Definitions
A widely used 2 definition of financial system is "the collection of markets, institutions, instruments, regulations and techniques, through which the financial securities are traded, interest rates are determined, and financial services are produced and delivered around the world" [Rose, Marquis, 2011, p. 3] . This definition presents the financial system holistically from a global perspective. According to another definition, a financial system is composed of four links: "financial instruments; financial markets; financial institutions; and the principles according to which the first three operate" [Pietrzak, Polański, Woźniak, 2008, p. 20] .
Representatives of NIE stress different aspects of the financial system. They refer directly to the definition of institutions as a rule and sanction mechanism, which leads them to consider a financial system as a "bundle of external and internal institutions that apply specifically to the financial markets. " Following this logic, one can claim that "the financial market 3 is (…) the playing field for agents, while the financial system itself provides the rules of the game" [Engerer, Schrooten, 2002, p. 9] . The value of shares and conditions for loans in bank-based systems are settled by agents, and the financial system provides them with the rules and procedures for executing transactions. This approach underlines the importance of game rules, playing fields and interlinkages between players. Corporate governance, from the perspective of institutional comparative studies, relates to the structure of rights and responsibilities among parties with a stake in the company [Aoki, 2001 ].
Amable's Research on Financial System and Corporate Governance
Amable analysed countries in different institutional areas, focusing on: 1) product market competition; 2) labour market (wage-labour nexus and labour-market institutions); 3) financial intermediation sector and corporate governance; 4) social protection; and 5) education system [Amable, 2003] .
After analysing those areas, Amable distinguished five types 4 of capitalism that are characterized by certain features related to complementarity [Amable, 2003 ]. An analysis of financial systems is essential to presenting a complete comparative assessment of different types of capitalism. According to Amable, the variety of financial systems is much more sophisticated than a simple dichotomic distinction between bank-based and market-based ones. In light of many papers [Matysek-Jędrych, 2007; Allen, Gale, 2001] as well as the theory related to the Variety of Capitalism [Hall, Soskice, 2001 ], Amable's broad empirical research and classification seems to be quite innovative. Many papers compare two models, namely bank-based and market-based ones.
Financial Systems and Corporate Governance in Amable's Final Results
Amable presents 5 main models of modern capitalism in terms of their financial systems and corporate governance practices. Those models are characterized by a unique set of institutional complementarities and interlinkages. Compared to previous works [Hall, Soskice, 2001] 5 , Amable's classification seems more complex and insightful [Borowski, Maszczyk, Olipra, 2015; Maszczyk, 2015] . This is because of the scope of analysis and (quite interesting) cluster method, which creates a multidimensional analysis scheme -even if some detailed assumptions may need improvement. In particular, although Amable's cluster method appears valid, such detailed assumptions as the contradiction between foreign bank concentration and bond market capitalization is controversial and may not be justified.
In subsequent research [Amable, 2003] , a simplistic dual vision of capitalism types was often rejected. The analysis conducted by Amable was useful for European public policies classification [Sapir, 2006] , and introduced an advanced, sophisticated, comparative view that went beyond the dichotomy of Liberal Market Economies (LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and therefore should be deemed as a significant contribution.
Amable's first model is market-based (Anglo-Saxon) capitalism. Countries included in this group are: Australia, Canada, United States and the United Kingdom. These economies are characterized by a market-based financial system and shareholder-based corporate governance. Direct company financing obtained through market channels plays a major role. Bank credit is of lesser importance. In the United States, the economy is only 25% bank-financed, while in Europe this fraction is about 75-80%. In the literature one can find recommendations to shift towards a market-based system, especially in the context of stricter capital regulations for banks and potential deleveraging after the financial crisis [Wehinger, 2012] . This is a sophisticated, multi-level and crucial issue for modern debate in Europe. Different aspects need to be considered -from bank size 6 to their complex business models, which contain both depository-lending and investment banking 7 .
In the Anglo-Saxon model banks act more as brokers and market makers for different financial instruments issued by companies. Fees and other remuneration linked to organizing equity or debt issuance represent a substantial part of banking system income. Bank credits, although present in those economies, are less developed. The profitability of the banking sector in a market-based economy is not dependent on net interest margin (the difference between interest income obtained by banks from borrowers and interest paid out to the lenders -e.g., depositors).
Company ownership is dispersed because most large and medium-sized enterprises are publicly traded. This creates an opportunity to develop investment funds, pension funds and other institutional investors. Pension funds may play a significant role in financial markets because the pension system is a capital-oriented one. Institutional investors provide services to their clients and sufficient liquidity levels to financial markets. Capital market transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, as well as Initial Public Offerings, are frequent and well developed. Constant valuation in the stock market and, in particular -mergers and acquisitions -allows swift, effective corporate governance. The financing of risky, innovative projects is provided by venture capitalists. Innovations are supported by specialized investment funds that seek high potential businesses while accepting substantial risk.
In market-based capitalism -as previously noted -banks are often involved in capital market transactions that can boost their profitability in comparison to the deposit-lending model of banking. Although the banking business model is becoming more similar among different countries, this is still the case. If we look at the ROE of the banking sector before and after the global banking crisis of 2007 (Figure 1 ), we can state that banks in market-based economies are more profitable than in European countries. The value of ROE in Poland (Figure 2 ) is similar to observed in European Continental countries. It also shows indirectly the "traditional", i.e. depository-lending, character of the Polish banking sector. Those features make the Polish banking sector less risky and less vulnerable to market shocks. Low interest rates, however, may affect the Polish financial system in a severe way, as its profitability is mainly based on net interest margin.
Classification of Poland's financial system is not the topic of the article. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here that Amable's framework does not work properly when applied to Poland and other post-socialist economies. The developing capitalism model that we observe in Poland is not consistent with any of the types identified by Amable, and constitutes a hybrid type [Romanowska, 2016] , sometimes classified as a dependent market economy [Nölke, Vliegenthart, 2009] . Regarding financial systems and corporate governance, the literature [Romanowska, 2016] indicates that Poland presents elements of Mediterranean, Social-democratic, and Continental models. Some restrictions on market functioning and efficient corporate governance, the poor quality of the business environment, and the prevailing role of foreign capital and underdeveloped equity financial markets are among the elements of the Polish hybrid type of capitalism in the financial system area [Romanowska, 2016] .
Amable's works focuses particularly on European Continental capitalism. The financial system is a vital pillar of that type of capitalism, which is characterized by mature transformation based on bank credits and loans. In comparison to the banking sector, financial markets are underdeveloped. In countries representing this type of capitalism (e.g., Germany, France, Austria, Norway) one can expect financial intermediaries (i.e. banks) to play an active role in strategy making, monitoring and corporate governance in the corporate sector. The diminishing uncertainty of the European banking system is -according to Amable -able to provide real economy with patient capital. As a result, it may help companies develop long-term, stable strategies and "invest" in social compromises and collaborative industrial relations.
Amable implies that funding stability is a major advantage of the European system over a market-based system. But Amable does not appear to sufficiently justify this statement in his work. Moreover, there are some counterexamples. Firstly, institutional investors (especially pension funds) can provide companies with stable capital, which they often invest in dividend "blue chips" companies. Moreover, when financing innovative ventures banks are not interested in granting loans due to high risk. It may be that private equity funds or business angel activities (as capital investors) are the primary solutions for start-up companies. The implicit -and not fully justified -assumption that bank credit is a more stable source of financing companies may undercut this part of Amable's research.
The remaining three types defined by Amable are: Social-democratic, Mediterranean and Asian capitalism. They are not presented here, since Tables 1 and 2 compare Amable's capitalism models and complementary interlinkages. 
The Role of Complementarity
The key issue that Amable brings to comparative studies of capitalism is a focus on complementarity. The concept of complementarity appears in the institutional economics literature [Aoki, 1994] and focuses on the diversity of capitalism 10 [Amable, 2003] . While there is no optimal institutional structure model for the economy, the different roles of institutions and governments are features that distinguish various market economies. The consistency of arrangements driving product markets, labour markets, financial systems, corporate governance, the welfare system and education determines the actual quality of the institutional environment in a given country. Studies of complementarity were a crucial step that laid the groundwork for Amable's classification of capitalism's types.
Amable provides several definitions of complementarity; the first refers to dynamic stability. Specifically, institutional complementarity occurs when an institution (its existence and features) in one area reinforces the effectiveness of other institutions [Amable, 2003] . The second definition underlines economic performance. Two institutional forms are complementary when they facilitate better functioning of the entire economic system; pushing it to local optimum and changing the institutional combination will create worse economic outcomes (e.g. in terms of GDP growth) [Amable et al., 2005] . Table 2 presents the main channels of complementarities [Amable, 2003] . Another, recent subject of much institutional research is innovation, particularly its interlinkages with other dimensions [Allen, 2013] , including the financial system and corporate governance [Tadasse, 2006] .
Amable focuses on one example of complementarity interlinkage. The crucial institutional arrangement that interacts with industrial relations and labour markets is the financial system [Amable et al., 2005; Amable, 2003 ]. This approach is also presented in other works [Hall, Soskice 2001] . Wage bargaining methods are related to historical conditions that would likely be difficult to change in the short-term. The combination included in the model is limited to: centralized and decentralized wage bargaining on the one hand, and bank-based and market-based financial systems on the other hand. Complementarity occurs when central wage bargaining is accompanied by a bank-based financial system, as well as when decentralized wage bargaining is followed by markets-based financing. This conclusion assumes that centralized wage bargaining supports long-term strategies. In that case, companies seek stable financing and (probably) employees with specific skills and education. Stable financing may be provided by banks, because their decisions are theoretically long-term and independent of current stock prices. Amable's research [Amable et al., 2005] provides an interesting and sophisticated view of this issue. Using a simple game theory model, he reaches conclusions related to the dynamics of trade union -manager relations. However, while Amable's results are consistent with the aforementioned ideas, they reveal a broader view. The primary outcome of the model is that the first agent -game participant -who breaks the cooperative deal (between trade unions and management or shareholders) due to increased pressure by financiers is the weaker player. The weaker player, in turn, is one whose remuneration would be more influenced. Secondly, one claims that strong trade unions (central wage bargaining and long-term cooperative relations between unions and management) are complementary with less developed financial markets. On the other hand, strong and influential financial markets are complementary with relatively weaker trade unions. In that case, employment conditions are negotiated individually and the position of workers is not protected. Both described combinations lead to a substantial probability of company survival. Given the above-mentioned dynamic stability definition of complementarity and Amable's analysis it appears that strong and well-developed financial markets may discourage cooperative strategies in inter-company relational settlements.
Although the presented model is convincing, the results may be hampered by the previously mentioned lack of sufficient proof that direct financing obtained through financial markets has to be more volatile than banking credit. It seems that the differentiated nature of financial markets should be included in the analysis. Financial markets are a mechanism for companies to obtain equity and debt, but a more detailed analysis is needed here. A good example of a fairly stable equity financing obtained through market channels is private equity, venture capital funds, and business angels' activities. Those investors provide companies with long-term financing and accept a high level of risk in exchange for a higher expected return. In general, pension funds are also interested in long-term capital investments.
Institutional Games
From a methodological perspective, it is worth mentioning that game theory is widely used to present complementarity [Amable, 2003] . While this method may not illustrate all potential institutional interlinkages in detail [Aoki, 2016] , in general it is useful for such research.
Nash equilibrium is defined as a list of strategies, one for each player, in which no player can unilaterally change his strategy and obtain a better payoff [Turocy, von Stengel, 2001] . In other words: a set of strategy profiles that are the best answers to each other. If we link this to the definitions of complementarity presented in this article, equilibrium from game theory depicts exactly the situations when institutional "choices" of particular agents are optimal at given "choices" of partners. Finding Nash equilibrium in the "institutional game" allows us to assume that the system should be stable and none of the agents has an incentive to initiate institutional change. Table 2 presents the most vital complementarities to financial system analysis. One can extend the game analysis proposed by Amable towards different vital complementarities. Below is an illustrative example of a sequential game, where an analysis of Nash equilibrium and Reinhard Selten's subgame perfect equilibrium 11 is presented. The game refers to interlinkages underlying complementary relations between the financial and education systems in a particular country. The game described below is another example of game theory application in institutional studies. It shows the interpretation of Selten's perfect equilibrium in the institutional context, which goes marginally beyond the framework used by Amable. It also illustrates the core idea of complementarity. Though simplistic, it may be a useful step to creating more complex models of finance-education interlinkages.
Game participants: 1. Companies ("C") that may choose between two strategies: looking for direct financing through market channel ("M") or through bank credit ("B"). 2. Potential workers ("W") that may choose between two options: a general or a specific education path. This leads to four strategies in sequential game: GG, GS, SG, SS. The first letter depicts the decision, if companies chose M. The second letter shows the decision when the first actor plays B. Following that rule, the strategy defined as GS means: workers choose general education if companies are financing themselves through market channels and specific education if banks prevail in the financial system of particular country.
In the presented version of the game one can assume that the choice of financial system precedes the education framework decision. This may fit well in reality, because an education scheme may be more easily reformed than a financial system. This is, however only an assumption and the game may also be structured in other ways 12 .
Those players should be treated as a personification of processes that take place in the economy with the involvement of other actors; the government as a coordinator. The payoff matrix (presented in the Scheme 1 and Scheme 2) shows that general education brings better results in countries with financial systems based on a market channel [Amable, 2003] .
That is why [M;GG] and [M;GS] are more beneficial for players than [M;SG] and [M;SS]. Choosing specific education in a country where companies are using bank credit is more beneficial due to the player's expected long-term involvement in one profession, job, or employer. This is illustrated in the game (Scheme 1 and It bears emphasis that the numbers presented in the schemes indicate the direction of differences between particular payoffs. They cannot be compared directly; for example, in this conceptual presentation two is bigger than one, but not necessarily two times bigger. Moreover, higher payoffs in the projected game for market-based financial systems over bank-based systems are an assumption made for the sake of presentation. In the real world, the issue of which equilibrium would be better in terms of payoffs is a very complex problem related to the history ("path dependence") 13 and detailed features of institutions. This cannot be easily verified or even presented with formal models. Despite some limitations imposed by these assumptions, using numbers to indicate the payoff matrix makes the analysis easier and more intuitive.
The game is based on the same stable bank credit financing idea that Amable assumes [Amable, 2003] . The game is therefore consistent with what Amable achieved in the field of complementary interlinkages. Confirmation of the assumption of "stable credit financing" in the context of institutional comparative studies may be an area of potential future scientific contribution. Empirical studies 14 face difficulties identifying one financial system (connected with complementary corporate governance) that supports better longterm growth [Levine, 2001] . The case of financing stability may be similar. Despite that, the lack of empirical or theoretical justification for assumed long-term and stable bank financing seems controversial, especially given the significance of this assumption to final analytical outcomes. Amable does not convince the reader that market-based financing is on average more volatile than banking credit. SCHEME 1. Financial system -education complementarities -game in the extensive form [6, 5] S o u r c e : own elaboration. GS] and is a perfect equilibrium (aforementioned Selten's definition), because it leads to the equilibrium in each subgame. This game concept corresponds well with the essence of institutional complementarity and depicts the best educational system in relation to the previously made choice referring to financial systems.
Summary. Criticism, Limitations of Amable's Research and Further Research Directions
Amable presented an interesting method of cluster analysis applied to financial systems and corporate governance -we reviewed and compared those results here. In general, we favour building wider classifications of capitalism. Such classifications could offer more complex and accurate views in comparison to the dichotomic differentiation presented among others by Hall and Soskice [Hall, Soskice, 2001] . Howev er, one should limit the number of classification categories to avoid describing particular countries and losing actual scientific contributions. There are still areas of improvement in Amable's analysis. Firstly, there is no convincing justification for differences between the European Continental model and the Social-democratic model in terms of finance.
Financial systems in many of the articles cited above are presented as variations of two extreme ideal models: bank-based and market-based. Creating a five-type classification may have facilitated the presentation of all institutional areas. In the case of financial systems, "partial" objection between markets and banks may be sufficient. Having said that, we recognize that the aim of Amable's work was to analyse whole economic systems -not only finance. Another issue worth mentioning is Amable's overly simplistic description of Asian economies and Asian financial systems.
Our analysis of Amable's method suggests that it is an appropriate tool for assessing types of modern capitalism. There are, however, several limits imposed by one assumption. The contradiction between foreign bank concentration and bond market capitalization does not have a strong theoretical or economic justification. The problem of rising volume of obligations (especially sovereign bonds) in bank balance sheets now goes far beyond comparative studies. This is a rather common dilemma for different economies that refers simply to a rising interdependence between the fiscal sector and stability of banks. A substantial part of the recent regulatory reforms in the EU (banking union) is aimed at stopping this adverse feedback [EC, 2015d] [BIS, 2012] . The problem also applies to other financial systems outside Europe.
Complementarity is Amable's most valuable contribution. Building classifications based on particular complementary interlinkages allows one to see the whole picture as far as macroeconomic reforms are concerned. Application of game theory principles in an institutional analysis is consistent with the observation that there is usually no best solution for institutional choices, they are interconnected and -moreover -final equilibrium states may not be Pareto optimal.
15 This opens a wide space for sophisticated research programs aimed at defining desirable and achievable institutional states for economies in particular countries or regions. Despite the advantages offered by Amable's approach, there is area for improvement. Empirical evidence for assuming that banks provide companies with more stable financing than markets is needed.
Taking into consideration specific features of the financial system and corporate governance analysis, we would also stress the homogenization trend. Business finance models have become increasingly similar to each other not only from an international perspective, but also in terms of different financial sectors (banks, investment funds, insurers) [Wagner, 2008] . The institutional shape of a financial system depends on more than only "path dependence" and complementary linkages with other institutional areas in the country. There are also strong international connections that influence domestic institutions. Legal and cultural aspects are valid as well. Those issues show that many theses may be still a subject of research in comparative studies.
Although Amable's framework may be criticized for several assumptions or interpretations, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. Research on connections between institutional complementarities and economic policy facilitate effectiveness, and assessing the potential application of Amable's methodology to current financial EU reforms (especially CMU) [EC, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c] may constitute an interesting step in future research in this area.
Notes in the list of systemic institutions even if their assets do not yet exceed, respectively, German and French GDP [Liikanen Report, 2012] . The crucial scientific questions nowadays are: what is the optimal size of the financial sector and leverage in the economy and how to assess the optimal size of employment in the financial sector [ASC, 2014; Arcand et al., 2012] . These vital questions are not directly related to the main topic of this article. However, it is worth noting that in the United States -being the most obvious example of market-based capitalism -dependence on banks is relatively smaller than in Europe. However, it is too early to claim here that the US financial system is less vulnerable to TBTF problem than in Europe. Many regulatory initiatives (for example banking union and CMU) are now being undertaken in the European Union to address this issue.
7 The sophisticated business model of a bank with strong lending (traditional) business and investment activities is characterized by a potentially higher maturity and liquidity risk. The risk was reinforced by rising leverage and eventually brought substantial vulnerability to the system. Universal banking has become popular in western economies (Europe and the United States), which is underlined as a source of growing financial system weakness [Wilmarth, 2009] .
8 A current view in the literature posits that types of capitalism in Asia are much more sophisticated. In [Witt, Redding, 2013] the following classification of Asian capitalism types is presented: (post) socialist, advanced city, emerging Southeast Asia, advanced Northeast Asia, and Japanese. It seems that in Amable's view [2003] the narrow and simplistic vision of Asian economies is a given.
9 An important issue behind differentiation between Anglo-Saxon and European capitalism is the presence of the common law in countries with latter type. Common law is connected with stronger protections of individual investors than that provided in statutory (civil) European legal acts [Ahlering, Deakin, 2007] .
10 See also further research by Aoki [2001] . 11 A subgame perfect equilibrium (or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. It is vital to mention that a common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria in the case of a finite game is backward induction [Osborne, 2004] . 12 In particular, in the case of non-sequential game with the same payoff matrix one can find two points of equilibrium: [M,G] and [B,S] . Mixed strategies, however mathematically possible, are not taken into account because the aim of the game is to focus on interlinkages between defined types of capitalism. When it comes to financial system choice the interpretation would be quite intuitive -a certain part of enterprises finance themselves on the market and the rest use a bank credit (structure of companies' sector liabilities). In terms of showing the state of education system, mixed strategies would not work so well. However, it is worth noting that game theory offers a significant number of tools that may be used to analyse institutional complementarity. 13 There are multiple definitions of path dependence. According to [David, 2000, p. 5] this term should be associated with "a process … [that -PP] is one whose asymptotic distribution evolves as a consequence (function of) the process's own history". For institutional comparative studies one can claim that this is the concept that institutions have been formed through a unique process that is valid for their current shape and functioning.
14 Research aimed at exploring the relationship between economic performance and financial structure -the degree to which a country's financial system is market-based or bank-based. 15 Game theory, specifically, the prisoner dilemma, may also be useful in illustrating suboptimal equilibrium points; for example, in the case of the Mediterranean model. This type was not, however, the topic of my article.
